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**Justice Ideologies, Income Justice, and the Welfare State**

**A Comparison of Justice Ideologies and the Perceived Justice of  
Income in the United States, West Germany, and the Netherlands**

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Bodo Lippl

Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Unter den Linden 6  
10099 Berlin

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by  
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Institut für Sozialwissenschaften  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Unter den Linden 6  
D-10099 Berlin  
Germany

Tel.: ++49-30-2093-4417  
Fax: ++49-30-2093-4430  
Email: [lippl@isjp.de](mailto:lippl@isjp.de)  
Internet: <http://www.isjp.de> bzw. <http://www.lippl.net>

## **ABSTRACT**

In times of economic and political crisis issues of justice gain importance provoking people to ask questions about the social conditions they live in and the justness of society. Ideological preferences for distributive justice and the justice evaluation of income play an important role in this process. Following Douglas (1996), justice ideologies are defined as convictions of how goods and burdens are to be distributed within a society assuming that these convictions are enduring reactions to the social environment of an individual. Douglas classifies social environments along the dimensions of "hierarchy" and "social closure" — "grid" and "group" in her terminology — distinguishing four types of environments that emerge from cross-tabulating these two forms of social organization. According to this scheme she distinguishes four types of justice ideologies.

This paper attempts to combine theoretically the Douglasian typology with the typology of welfare states suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990). Welfare state regimes are characterized by particular modes of distributing goods and life chances and are thus likely to affect the justice beliefs of those who are ruled by these regimes. Building on the grid-group framework, hypotheses are developed of how particular welfare regimes will foster support for particular justice ideologies. Using data of the "International Social Justice Project" 1991 and 1996 I test these hypotheses for the United States, West-Germany, and the Netherlands. I focus in particular on the relative weight of respondents' characteristics versus welfare regimes in explaining the degree of preference of justice ideologies and the perception of income justice. Results suggest that liberal welfare states (USA) foster an individualistic justice ideology while socialist welfare states (The Netherlands) evoke egalitarianism. In conservative welfare states (West-Germany) people prefer individualistic as well as egalitarian justice ideologies. Though Fatalism is generally high, it is more expressed in liberal and socialist than in conservative welfare states. This result may point to a crisis of the political system and the welfare state.

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## I. Introduction

In times of rapid economic and political change and the "crisis of the welfare state" (Alber 1988), issues of justice gain importance, provoking people to ask questions about the social conditions they live in and the justness of society. The distribution of welfare is often questioned, not only because of objective factors causing changes in the present welfare system, but also because subjective values and ideologies change. Therefore it is interesting to understand public attitudes toward the distribution of welfare. These ideological changes can in turn alter the institutional structure of the welfare state. In this respect, individual attitudes can be seen as a mouthpiece toward matters of justice. As a result, sociological research on public attitudes toward justice emerges as a central topic in the research of social inequality.

In the sciences we make the distinction between philosophical and empirical approaches to questions of justice.<sup>1</sup> For sociology empirical theories of justice are most adequate to be able to describe and reconstruct the shape and articulations of justice ideas. From empirical theories we can learn that it does indeed matter what the people think about justice (Swift et al. 1995), and that empirical justice research makes more sense than metaphysical or natural law deductions of justice promise.

Within empirical sociological justice research there are two different modes. First, one can analyze general justice ideologies or principles people hold for various aspects of their lives (e.g. for distribution regimes). Alternatively, one can examine people's evaluation of concrete results of distributions in a society. In the first case one can speak of order-related, in the second of action- or result-related justice research (Wegener 1992). One can also speak of Macro-Justice and Micro-Justice (Brickman et al. 1981).

In this paper I will look empirically at both modes of justice-articulations by considering the influence of the welfare state as an institution with great impact on people's lives and perceptions of justice. Welfare state regimes are characterized by particular modes of distributing goods and life chances, and are thus likely to affect the justice beliefs of those who live under these regimes. I will compare countries with differing conceptions of welfare

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<sup>1</sup> In philosophical respect (Cullen 1992) we might think of the grand theories of John Rawls' "Theory of Justice" (1979), Michael Walzer's "Spheres of Justice" (1992) and other philosophers as Nozick (1974), Hayek (1981), or Barry (1989). In considering justice not as something that metaphysically exists, but as something that is socially constructed, we have to consider the less known empirical theories of justice, such as the theory of relative deprivation (Runciman 1966), equity theory (Homans 1961), status value theory (Berger et al. 1972), the justice function theories (Jasso & Rossi 1977; Alves & Rossi 1978; Jasso 1978; 1980; 1989), the dominant ideology thesis (Abercrombie et al. 1980; 1990), the split consciousness theory (Kluegel & Smith 1986), or the theory of primary and secondary justice ideologies (Wegener & Liebig 1991; 1992). An overview of empirical justice theories is given by Cohen (1986) Wegener (1992) and Liebig (1997). Though philosophical approaches tend to be more widely known, the empirical ones are no less important. In order to obtain the maximum insight into the processes which lead to the development of notions of justice and justice evaluations, great effort should be made to combine the two separate wings of justice theory.

states, and evaluate the impact of these different distribution and security regimes. First, I will analyze individual preferences of order-related justice ideologies. According to Douglas (1996), justice ideologies are defined as convictions of how goods and burdens are to be distributed within a society, assuming that these convictions are enduring reactions to the social environment of an individual. Douglas classifies social environments along the dimensions of "hierarchy" and "social closure" — "grid" and "group" in her terminology — distinguishing four types of environments that emerge after cross-tabulating these two forms of social organization. Using this scheme, she distinguishes four types of justice ideologies. In order to relate justice ideologies to the welfare state, this paper first attempts to theoretically combine the Douglasian typology with the typology of welfare states suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990). Building on the grid-group framework, hypotheses are developed of how particular welfare regimes will foster support for particular justice ideologies. In the second part of this paper, I focus on perceptions of the distribution of income and the role of the welfare state in this process. The assessment of what is perceived as a fair wage is a crucial issue in modern societies. Income is a central objective, as it determines the wealth of an individual, the attribution of a position within society, the wealth of groups of people etc. Income rewards people for their effort and provides resources with which to manage their daily life and to serve their needs. To draw on a functionalist argument, the perception and judgement of the justice of income can therefore be seen as an important indicator for the stability of a society.

The main argument of this paper is that there are not just individual social factors such as gender, age, social class, prestige etc., that determine justice-attitudes, justice ideologies and justice evaluations, but also effects on macro-level. These macro-level influences can be verified by comparing different countries, and explained by pointing out the welfare state as the institution transporting justice ideas. The importance of the specific shape of the welfare state in these countries is stressed in order to explain the results of order-related and result-related justice judgements of people. Countries chosen were the United States, the Netherlands and West Germany, because they represent different types of welfare states (liberal, conservative and socialist) according to the regime-typology of Esping-Andersen (1990).

## II. Theoretical Framework: Welfare State and Justice

The term "welfare state" usually refers to those aspects of a political regime which aim to provide *security* with respect to the negative consequences of modernity, *equality* with respect to the realization of civil, political and social rights of individuals (Haller 1986, ), and *justice* with respect to the distribution of welfare, which is produced collectively. The origin of the welfare state is commonly traced to the industrial revolution and its negative side effects. Its development reflects a history of reactions to situations of crisis (Flora & Heidenheimer 1987). The welfare state is the historical answer to an objective complex of problems facing industrialized societies trying to achieve greater socioeconomic equality. It is a special form of state intervention which guaranties stability, certainty, and reliability, and conveys a feeling of trust and safety. The welfare state is a multi-dimensional enterprise with different forms of institutionalisations that can be considered. To include all theoretical and empirical aspects, one must look at (1) the goals, tasks, purposes, and functions, (2) the institutions and procedures, and (3) the historic dimension of the welfare state (Pioch & Vobruba 1995).

As historical political constellations and socioeconomic conditions differ from nation to nation, every country has its own specific shape of welfare state. By comparing welfare states crossnationally, one can distinguish different types of welfare states and learn from their specific appearance. The interaction between attitudes of individuals and the function and purpose of welfare states is of central importance to this paper.

The historical development of the welfare state has corresponded to a demand to create more justice in a society. But the opinions of how to realize more justice and what justice should be realized differ between individuals within a society *and* between societies. There are conflicting views as to how to distribute the welfare of a society, how much social inequality in a society is just, and even necessary, and what should be done to reduce the social inequality which is judged as too high. It is not the objective social inequality in different countries that is examined in this paper, but the subjective judgement of the objective and perceived inequality, in other words the individual preference of distributive justice ideologies and the perception and evaluation of the justice of income.

### A. Conception of Analysis


The relationship between welfare states and justice requires twofold analysis. In sociology, these aspects are discussed under the headings structure and action, and the relation and interdependence between the two (Giddens 1988). For the topic of justice and the welfare state, we can see on the one hand that welfare states can be understood as a collection of varying justice-conceptions which were introduced via political processes over the course of their historic development. Dominant as well as non-dominant justice-attitudes of different time periods have left their marks in the structure of welfare states. Welfare states are

therefore structures which transport justice ideas and convictions. On the other hand, the individual perception of justice is not independent of the structures and contexts in which people live. The welfare state as transporter of justice conceptions is therefore one of many aspects which effects individual perception and judgements of justice. In this paper I emphasize the influence of the welfare state on justice judgements and perceptions.

Generally speaking, individual perception of justice can be influenced by macro-sociological and micro-sociological factors. On the macro-level, I see the specific conception of the welfare state as an important factor in the determination of justice ideas. Others stress the political culture, the economic and social structure of a country (e.g. development of unemployment, income-mobility etc.), the value- and norm-system of a society, and the institutional forces (Haller 1989, 449). One might also find a specific 'dominant ideology' within a country (Abercrombie et al. 1978; 1980; 1990) or 'primary' and 'secondary' justice-ideologies (Wegener & Liebig 1991; Liebig & Wegener 1995), which can be motivated by religion, and shape individual judgement within such a society. But in this paper I want to present the welfare state as the most interesting and influential factor determining justice attitudes and judgements because justice ideas of the past are incorporated in its institutional structure and functioning. On the micro-level, on the other hand, the position of an individual within the dimensions of the social stratification system (e.g. sex, age, religion, education, occupation, income, social status etc.) can explain justice-judgements and justice ideologies. Micro- and macro-level must be taken into account independently in the analysis, but one must also consider the possibility of interactive effects resulting from the ways in which micro- and macro-level are interconnected.

In this paper I want to examine those influences of micro-level and macro-level factors which are most adequately captured in the welfare state. Macro-level effects can be shown by comparing different countries, especially in respect to the specific shape of the welfare state. The countries chosen for investigation differ in the type of welfare state they represent to make clear the effects of the specific type of welfare state on the formation of justice ideas. To distinguish between welfare states, I draw on the popular welfare-state-typology of Esping-Andersen (1990), which discusses differences between the liberal, conservative, and socialist type of welfare state. For the empirical analysis of this paper I have chosen the United States, West Germany and the Netherlands as representatives for these regimes.

In figure 1, the conception of the analysis of this paper is shown graphically. One sees the two different types of factors which effect individuals in their attitude towards general justice ideologies on the one side and concrete justice judgements on the other side. The expression of justice ideologies as well as the justice evaluations (of income) depend on micro-level factors, which determine the position of an individual in a society, and macro-level factors, pertaining to the constitution and influence of the welfare state in which people live. Because justice ideologies are general attitudes toward all different aspects of the social life, they can also effect justice evaluations themselves.

**Figure 1: Micro- and Macro-Effects on Justice Ideologies and Justice Evaluations**

In this paper I want to look at four justice ideologies which have, in previous research, been adequate for describing most possible convictions as to how welfare should be distributed in a society (Wegener & Liebig 1992; 1998). The justice ideologies can be characterized as egalitarianism, individualism, fatalism and ascriptivism. Egalitarianism and individualism are especially important in respect to the welfare state, as they express whether people tend to favour more redistribution or a structure with greater inequality. Apart from these order-related and more general justice ideologies, the justice evaluation of the income of people in different professions is analyzed. In looking at the income of a chairman of a large company compared to that of an unskilled worker, respondents are asked to judge whether these people are overrewarded, underrewarded or justly rewarded for their respective jobs. However, the question which should be answered in this paper is which factors have which influences on justice-judgements.

## **B. Typology of Social Environments and Thought Styles**

The recent anthropological studies of Mary Douglas (1982; 1996) attempts to empirically verify her central thesis that every single decision made by an individual (e.g. consumer decisions, decisions about the way of medical care, choosing religions etc.) is the result of a more basic conception of an ideal society. When individuals make concrete decisions, they imply preferences for a society in which they would choose to live. In other words, individual preferences — the values, convictions and decisions of individuals — can be understood as reactions to the social conditions and formations in which they live. Prevailing convictions and values help individuals to justify their thoughts and actions.

For Douglas, there are two relevant dimensions to describe the social environment of individuals. These dimensions are referred to as grid and group. *Grid* represents the "dimension of individuation" whereas *group* represents the "dimension of social incorporation" (Douglas 1982, 190). The grid dimension emphasizes the constraints that the social environment puts on individuals via strong hierarchical structures, norms, and regulations. The group-dimension acknowledges the fact that people are to varying degrees integrated in social entities. In both dimensions there can be either a strong or weak influences. Cross-tabulating the two dimensions grid and group we can distinguish four typical social constellations: weak group/high grid, weak group/low grid, strong group/low grid, strong group/high grid (see figure 2).

**Figure 2: Grid-Group Paradigm according to Douglas (1982)**

	Weak group	Strong group
High grid	ISOLATE	HIERARCHIST
Low grid	INDIVIDUALIST	ENCLAVIST

Each type of individual can be seen as some sort of product of its unique social setting, described by the dimensions of grid and group. These types of individuals compete with each other. The *hierarchist* emerges in a social setting with strong group ties, high hierarchical structure, and fixed positions for everyone. Social positions are normed, taken for granted and bound to special rights and duties which are shared with people in the same positions, while others (e.g. strangers to those positions) are excluded. *Enclavists* are socially integrated but within weaker hierarchical structures. Individuals in higher positions are not allowed to have special rights, as the group and its interest stands in the foreground. The *individualist* is found in a social setting with weak social integration and low hierarchical pressures. There are almost no hierarchical restrictions and no forces to show social solidarity with the group. In this environmental setting, individual effort and self-assertion are the main means to success. *Isolates* are found when almost no group solidarity and social incorporation create restrictions on fixed positions in a predominantly hierarchical environment, and as a result the isolate perceives his situation as a result of misfortune.

These types of individuals are recognizable by describing different landscapes of social settings with their specific structures. Every society, group, or social environment brings about its unique type of individual as reaction to it. However, this differentiation must not be understood as a strictly determined demographic division of populations. It is important to realize the subjective perception and interpretation of social conditions by which the four cosmologies are separated. The above described types of individuals develop their specific thought styles as a form of reaction to these different and opposite social environments. Focusing on questions of the responsibility for the distribution of resources and whom should

be given which amount of goods turns the discussion to questions of justice. There are two central questions which are answered differently in all four cosmologies: Who should be the distributor and what distribution result should be achieved?

**Figure 3: Thought Styles of Justice according to Douglas (1996) and Wegener & Liebig (1997)**

	Weak group	Strong group
High grid	FATALISM	ASCRIPTIVISM
Low grid	INDIVIDUALISM	EGALITARIANISM

Focussing on justice problems, the four social conditions can also be associated with four types of justice ideologies: ascriptivism, egalitarianism, individualism and fatalism (see figure 3). Ascriptivism corresponds to strong group ties, strong hierarchical structures, and rigid rules. The social position is given ascriptively to the individual. Egalitarianism is the relevant justice ideology when there are strong group ties but weak hierarchical restrictions. People tend to give in to the pressures of group solidarity. Individualism is fostered when the group influence as well as the hierarchical ties are weak. The only thing that seems to count in this setting is individual effort and achievement. And individuals who are exposed to strong hierarchical structures and rules but have weak group ties are isolated. Therefore this thought style can be described as fatalistic.

These four justice ideologies can be understood as individual styles of reactions to structural conditions. They are convictions of individuals, which are related to many spheres of life. Referring to questions of justice, these cosmologies can also stand for distributive patterns of justice and results. They provide insight into how people would like goods and bads to be distributed within their society. These different convictions can be interpreted justice-related as general justice ideologies.

Ascriptivists are interested in preserving the status-hierarchy and the staus quo. The distribution is accepted as something naturally given, whereby no possibility and no need for change is seen. Individuals preferring egalitarianism tend to favour more state activity to ensure redistribution. In most cases, they feel the state should be the main actor, and provide a just distribution of wealth and poverty. Their high group solidarity causes them to favor a maximum of degree of equality. Individualists think that good and hard work should be rewarded above all else. They hold a system of free competition to be fair. Achievement should be rewarded with success and a high social position. Isolated individuals have no hope in justice. As fatalists they believe that destiny is the cause of social conditions, and justice is therefore denied.

Justice ideologies can be conceptualized according to Douglas' cultural theory as thought styles, which are individual reactions to different social settings divided under the coordinates of grid and group. Welfare states and their institutional shape and mechanisms can be understood as social settings in the sense of Douglas. In this paper, I want to look specifically at welfare states and their effect on subjective justice ideologies and the perception of social inequality with respect to the justice of income. But before I can combine the theoretical frame expanded by Douglas with specific welfare states as social settings, different types of welfare states must be described by drawing on the work of Gøsta Esping-Andersen.

### **C. Typology of Welfare-States**

Types of welfare states have a heuristic function in this analysis as they provide the theoretical background on which different country's effects can be interpreted. They give insight in the major structural principles and cultural convictions of a country.

Welfare states act within market societies and bring in a social element by redistributing resources to ensure the well-being of a whole population. Welfare states do not only work by compensating social injuries through the market, but also through their constitution themselves. The welfare state influences people's lives and life-courses not only through redistributing money and resources but also through its institutional form, through structuring social life prior to any redistribution (Lessenich 1994; 1995, 64). The aim of the welfare state is to provide security, equality (Zapf 1989) and justice (Zacher 1989). The question however is, what exactly is security, equality and justice?

In comparison with former welfare state typologies (Titmuss 1974; Furniss & Tilton 1977; Korpi 1980; Mishra 1981) the advantage of Esping-Andersen is, that attention is paid not just to the compensative function of the welfare state, but also to the constitutive element (Kohl 1993; Offe 1993). It is important for him how, by which criteria, through which institutions, to whom, and why distribution through the welfare state is going on, rather than how much is distributed. The policy of a welfare state is therefore important in that it constitutes a special 'distribution-ideology'.

Esping-Andersen regards the specific public-private mix as the institutional setting of welfare-programmes. A second concept is 'decommodification', which expresses the extent to which individuals can be made independent from market-forces. And third, each welfare regime has its own characteristic way of structuring sociality, and instituting a certain structure of social inequality (Kohl 1993).

Esping-Andersen distinguishes between liberal, conservative and socialist welfare states, each of which can be understood as a historically stable macro-structures. In Figure 4 the main aspects and characteristics are combined.

**Figure 4: Typology of Welfare States according to Esping-Andersen (1990)**

Regime-Type	Liberal	Conservative	Socialist
Central regulative idea	Self-responsibility	Status-Hierarchy	Universalism
Decommodification (=protection against market)	low	medium	high
Main social structuring effect	Exclusion	Segmentation	Inclusion
Attributed Countries	USA (Canada, Australia, Great Britain)	West Germany (Austria, France, Italy, Belgium)	The Netherlands (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway)
	Anglo-Saxon Countries	Continental European Countries	Scandinavian Countries

Sources: Esping-Andersen 1990; Kohl 1993; Lessenich 1995.

The *liberal* type of welfare state occurs predominantly in the Anglo-Saxon world and is ideally realized in the United States. The market is ruling and providing the welfare of the people. There is a minimum of welfare state institutions, and interventions have to work according to market-rules. The state sees its main job as stabilizing the market and providing law and order. Social security lies in the self-responsibility of each individual. The state only provides the absolute minimum of social benefits. Allocation and redistribution is done more by the market, and less by the state. The extent of decommodification is low. People depend on the market and its technique of distributing work and reward. Social stratification is a result of market-processes and their distributive criteria.

The *conservative* type of welfare state can be found mostly in Continental European Countries. Its form is best realized in Germany. The welfare of the people in this type of state is not universally secure, however state activity is higher than in the liberal type. Social security is preserved through intermediate institutions. The state concentrates on those activities which back up the existing status-hierarchy. There is mandatory participation in the social security system and in social insurances. Welfare is provided according to position in the labour market. The existing status hierarchy is translated into the system of welfare provision. The principle of meritocracy is dominant: only those working, who contribute, can claim service and support from the system. Social security must be 'earned' through participation on the labour market. A special assumption of this welfare type is its normative basis. For most situations a 'male breadwinners' exists, who provides both the income for the family and the construct of a 'normal-working-relationship' (full-time-job, full social security, special working hours etc.; Mückenberger 1985, 1990). Decommodification depends strongly on one's position on the labour market. Those who do not participate fully on the labour market are either dependent on the male bread-winner or lack of full social security. This regime-type favours a segmented labour market and a hierarchically segmented society.

In the *socialist* welfare model, which can be found mostly in Scandinavian countries (especially in Sweden, Norway), the state takes full responsibility for the social welfare of the people by ensuring a universal minimum standard of living. Each individual has the right to claim social benefits independently of his or her position in the labour force or meritocracy. The state itself provides jobs in the public sector and favours redistribution of money and social services. The degree of decommodification is therefore high, as people get a basic welfare state provision and a basic social security provision independently of their position in the labour force. This type of welfare state tends to equalize social classes and social inequalities.

#### D. Welfare State Regimes and Justice Ideologies

The welfare state typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) is being used here as a heuristic framework to interpret the results in this analysis. Welfare states are institutions of societies and can therefore be understood as social settings with which people have to live and deal, and to which they must react. This is a theoretical connection of the work of Esping-Andersen and Mary Douglas. Welfare states as social settings induce thought styles, with respect to justice primary ideologies, as individual reaction to their institutional shape and functioning (see figure 5).

**Figure 5: Types of Welfare States and Justice Ideologies**

	Weak group	Strong group
High grid		CONSERVATIVE WELFARE STATE  ACRIPTIVISM
Low grid	LIBERAL WELFARE STATE  INDIVIDUALISM	SOCIALIST WELFARE STATE  EGALITARIANISM

The redistribution in the sociodemocratic welfare regime is high, and people are socially included as much as possible. Strong solidarity among individuals corresponds with a low hierarchical structure resulting from extensive redistribution (strong group/low grid). The main justice ideology is therefore egalitarianism. In liberal welfare states all burdens fall on the individual, which has to care for itself. With some individuals dropping out of the social net, there is less political solidarity. There is a weak hierarchical structure, which means that higher social positions are open to those who struggle and work hard, as individual effort is rewarded (weak group/low grid). Therefore individualism is expected as the main justice

ideology. The society of the conservative welfare states can be characterized by high formal hierarchisation, and also includes people socially. Everyone has a place in this social setting. Welfare redistribution takes place according to one's own social position and therefore mirrors and reproduces the social hierarchy. The state guarantees that everyone with the same position gets equal income, welfare and security. Everyone is socially included, but has his special position (strong group/high grid). Ascriptivism is therefore expected as dominant justice ideology.

Considered theoretically, every type of welfare state seems to '(re-)produce' its own dominant ideology on individual level. Individual justice ideologies are reactions to specific social settings, here in respect to welfare states, which structure social life and individual perception. It is important to note that these ideologies must be considered as the dominant convictions of people, but not the only ones. All other ideologies can also be found in these countries, in different respects. It is also expected that the preferences of all ideologies are specifically mixed on country level and also effected by the individual social positions of people on individual level. This means that not only macro-sociological effects (country-effects), but also micro-sociological effects, or structural effects of sociodemographic variables and variables related to various dimensions of respondent's position in the social stratification system, are expected in the analysis. For a macro level example, in the United States (liberal welfare state, weak group/low grid), individualism is preferred as the dominant justice ideology, while in West Germany (conservative welfare state, strong group/high grid), ascriptivism, and in the Netherlands (socialist welfare state, strong group/low grid) egalitarianism. And for example on individual level: People with higher social standing, income, and education tend to favour individualism as justice ideology, whereas people with lower social standing, income, and education tend to prefer egalitarianism.

## **E. Welfare States and the Justice Evaluation of Incomes**

To ask people to judge the income of people in high prestige professions and in low prestige professions provides a measure of the social inequality in a country. The justice of the social inequality structure of a country can be discovered by finding out whether people in different social positions (in the occupational sphere) are overrewarded, underrewarded or just rewarded.

Welfare states have a great impact on the income structure and the distribution of inequality in a country. They structure the social life as well as the life of individuals by providing security, redistributing welfare or mirroring the social hierarchy. The influence of the shape of the welfare state is different in each country. Generally speaking, in socialist welfare states, job incomes are perceived as being more just than in liberal welfare states because the state is providing redistribution, while in liberal welfare states the free market results in higher degree of income inequality. It is suggested that people in higher social positions earn far more money in liberal welfare states than in social democratic welfare states. People in high

prestige professions are perceived as being greatly overrewarded in liberal welfare states. By contrast, the incomes of people in low prestige professions are judged as less underrewarded in socialist welfare states than in liberal welfare states. Conservative welfare states are positioned somewhere in the middle, as they mirror the social hierarchy by providing welfare benefits according to one's contributions to the system, and try to redistribute inequalities according to the needs of the market generated inequalities.

## IV. Research Design

After explaining the theoretical framework of this analysis, some empirical remarks to the data set, the construction of the dependent and independent variables and the research design are as follows.

### A. Data

The data-basis of this analysis comes from two surveys of the *International Social Justice Project* (ISJP) from 1991 and 1996. The ISJP is a crossnational research project on perceptions and judgements of justice in 12 countries.<sup>2</sup> In this analysis I use trend-data from the Netherlands and West Germany<sup>3</sup> (1991 and 1996) and data from the United States (only 1991). In all, there are 6811 cases in the analysis included: 1414 cases from the United States 1991, 1783 cases from the Netherlands 1991, 790 cases from the Netherlands 1996, 1837 cases from West Germany 1991 and 987 cases from West Germany 1996. The population of people older than 18 can be taken as representative in all countries.

### B. Measurement of Variables

Justice ideologies and the justice judgements are the main aspects to be analyzed, and are the dependent variables in this study. The four justice ideologies — individualism, egalitarianism, ascriptivism and fatalism — correspond to the four cosmologies of Mary Douglas' typology of social settings. The four ideologies are operationalized as factor scores generated by factor analysis of several items described in the appendix table 1. The factor scores were extracted with varimax rotation over the joint population of all countries in 1991 and 1996. Separate factor analysis for every country confirms that in all countries and times the same factor

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<sup>2</sup> Participants in the 1991-survey were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Germany (West and East-Split), Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and the United States. In 1996 the survey was repeated especially in the East-European transformation countries of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany (East and West), Hungary, the Netherlands and Russia, in order to show the social change of justice-beliefs in new developing democracies. For more information on the ISJP-Project see Klügel et al. (1995) and Christoph et al. (1998).

<sup>3</sup> Data from East Germany cannot be considered as the implementation of welfare programs accompanying the transformation process of the former GDR would be a different topic, and there is an insufficient historical welfare tradition to be analyzed. For a comparison of East and West Germany see Wegener & Liebig (1998).

structure occurs, which means that the structure of justice ideologies is comparable in all countries.

The evaluations of the justice of income of different professions (chairman of a large national company and an unskilled manual worker) were operationalized by drawing on the work of Guillermina Jasso and Bernd Wegener (Jasso 1978, 1980, 1989, Jasso & Wegener 1997), who grounded empirical justice research mathematically by formulating justice judgements in a mathematical equation as the logarithm of the ratio of the actual reward to the just reward. In this paper, actual and just rewards relate to income. Therefore the equation can be written in the following manner<sup>4</sup>:

$$\textit{Justice Evaluation}_{\textit{Income}} = \ln \left[ \frac{\textit{Actual Income}}{\textit{Just Income}} \right]$$

When the actual income is judged as higher than the just income, the justice evaluation has a positive value. If the income of a person or profession is perceived as too high, the person is regarded as overrewarded ( $JE > 0$ ). Similarly, a person is perceived as underrewarded when the amount of the just income is specified higher than the actual income ( $JE < 0$ ). A person is judged as being justly rewarded when the amount of the actual and the just income are the same ( $JE = 0$ ). "The log-ratio form of the justice evaluation function has many good properties. It provides a mapping of the justice evaluation variable onto the full real-number line, with zero representing the point of perfect justice, negative numbers representing unjust underreward (overburden), and positive numbers representing unjust overreward (underburden)" (Jasso & Wegener 1997, 410).

In this paper, non-reflexive judgements of people are analyzed, meaning that these judgements refer to the rewards of others and not to those of themselves. People were asked to tell what they think others in particular professions (chairman or managing director of a large corporation and an unskilled manual worker) actually earn, and then what they should earn (see table 1 in the appendix). The new variables were calculated according to the mathematical equation above.

Independent variables include respondents' sociodemographic variables, as well as those variables related to various dimensions of respondents standing in the social stratification system. An overview of the measurement of these variables, namely sex, age, household size, social standing, income, education, and political views, and of the method of their construction is given in table 2. Sex, the occupational status and the country variables are constructed as dummies. Independent variables also include attitudinal items containing the

<sup>4</sup> The justice evaluation in the mathematical theory of distributive justice force is a theoretical construction, expressing the observer's *perceived* evaluation of justice. It is transformed into the observer's *expression* of justice evaluation by multiplying the justice-equation above by an error quantity, usually called the expressiveness coefficient  $|\theta|$  (Jasso & Wegener 1997, 411).

individual attitudes toward the perception of income inequality in the respective country and the satisfaction of each respondent with the political system of the respective country. More complicated is the forming of the 'relational income', which is calculated in a way analogous to the Jasso-justice-equation shown above. The equivalent household income of a respondent was divided through the mean-average equivalent household income in this country and time. This newly created variable can be interpreted as the ratio of the respondent's household income to the average household income in this country and time.<sup>5</sup>

### **C. Data Analysis and Research Methods**

As mentioned above, factor analysis is used to extract the four justice ideologies as a possible reaction to different social settings in the sense of Douglas. The derived factor scores will be regressed on various sociodemographic variables and on those related to the position in the stratification system (model I). Then, variables containing the individual attitudes toward the perception of income inequality in the respective country and the satisfaction of each respondent with the political system of the respective country were added to the regression model (II). Finally, the country/time dummy variables are added (model III) to show specific country differences in the preference of the justice ideologies.

After showing structural, attitudinal and country effects on justice ideologies, the analysis focuses on the perception and justice evaluation of the income of a chairman of a large national company and an unskilled manual worker. In this second step of the analysis, the effects of the same structural, attitudinal and country variables are tested, now including the justice-ideologies egalitarianism and individualism. These themselves become explanatory variables in the regression models that show effects on justice evaluations of the income of the two professions. Here again model I presents only structural effects, model II presents attitudes, in model III presents justice ideologies, and in model IV country/time dummies are included.

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<sup>5</sup> The equivalent household income was calculated by dividing the mentioned total household income through the number of people in the household. Each additional person in the household of the respondent was counted by the factor 0,7. There are several advantages of using the household income and this mathematical procedure. There are fewer missing values using the household income than using the job income. The household income for a single person is also a better measure for the social standing of a person because it captures the amount of money a person 'really' has at his or her disposal as all possible income sources are included. Using the ratio of the equivalent household income to the mean equivalent household income for a given country and time makes it easier to handle problems of different currencies, brutto-netto differences in some countries, and of different time frames in the questionnaire.

## V. Findings and Discussion

Looking at various tables (4-7) in the appendix, we can see the numerical results of the empirical regression analysis on justice ideologies and the justice evaluation of incomes. These are described and discussed in the following with reference to some highlights and in consideration of the theoretical explications mentioned above.

### A. Justice Ideologies

Table 4 of the appendix contains the regression models for the justice ideologies in model I. Only the influence of the sociodemographic variables, and variables related to various dimensions of the social stratification system, can be seen. We can see that women tend to be more egalitarian and less individualistic than men. This result is not surprising as it coincides with results of other studies (Liebig & Wegener 1995, 283f). Arguing according to gender different patterns of socialisation, women favour more social solidarity, more values of caring, and tend to be less egoistic, while men tend to be more egoistic and less solidararian. Egalitarianism is therefore closer to women's 'ethics of care', while individualism fits more to market principles, competition and social inequality according to ones effort. In looking at age, we can see that elder people tend to be less egalitarian and more ascriptivist, which can be explained by situation- and generation-specific values, which involve thinking of the meaning of a 'hard working life' or the imagination of the earning the fruits of ones working life in the old age. The retired and disabled displayed the opposite result. This group tends to be more egalitarian because they have to rely on the welfare expenditure of the state, and more fatalistic because they are confronted with radical changes in technology and society, and are also closer to death. Table 5 in the appendix shows that country specific individual effects are behind these seemingly opposing results. Here we can see that the stronger preference of egalitarianism by the retired and disabled is significant only in the Netherlands, where this group has to rely on the support of welfare expenditure. Only the elderly in the United States prefer less egalitarianism, which might be understood by considering the 'looking back on ones life'-effect, which tends to elicit meritocratic thoughts and principles. Individualism, on the other hand, is favoured more by the elderly in the Netherlands and less by those in the United States.

Looking at the variables describing the social standing of the respondents, one could argue that different redistributive interests are behind their specific attitudes. People who think that they have a higher social standing are more individualistic and less egalitarian. The higher the household income in relation to the average household income, the more individualistic, less egalitarian, and less fatalistic people are. This is not surprising, as those people in advantaged positions profit from individualism. They do not want any redistribution (what egalitarianism aims at), because they would be the ones that would lose wealth. They are less fatalistic, as

they are not in a position of risk and they do not have to care for their future outcome. People with higher education tend to be less egalitarian, less individualistic, and less fatalistic. This could be true because more educated people are also less affected by any of the possible social conditions which enforce justice ideologies or thought styles according to Douglas. They support justice ideologies less. Turning to people's occupational situations, we find that self-employees are more individualistic and less egalitarian. This was expected considering their self interest as motivation. They do not want redistribution through the state, because they would lose money for which they have personally struggled. They are more individualistic because they have to work on their own, and do not want to lose money which they have earned from their own business. By contrast, it is also clear that the unemployed, and others without work, favour egalitarianism, as they profit from the redistribution. They are dependent on monetary help from the state.

It is also quite common that people who see themselves as politically to the left are more egalitarian and less individualistic, often despising market forces, criticising capitalism, and wanting more state influence in redistribution of money. High social inequality is actively fought against. It is interesting that they are less fatalistic, probably because they are more politically active, and have a fulfilling life through criticising social change and the development of society. People who have no political orientation, because they are politically disengaged and do not go to elections, display stronger fatalistic attitudes. They have no hope in a more just society.

In model II, the effect of other individual attitudes is shown and increases the R-Square value slightly for all justice ideologies. The perception of objective social inequality in a country influences justice ideologies. The more people believe that the income differences are higher in the country in which they live, the more their preferred ideologies are egalitarian, rather than individualistic and ascriptivistic. Looking at the country-specific table 5 we can see that this effect is strongest in the Netherlands and weakest in the United States. In the United States, people seem to be most insensitive in their justice views as consequence when perceiving high social inequality. Also interesting are the effects of satisfaction with the political system. People who are more satisfied with the political system are less egalitarian and fatalistic, but more individualistic and ascriptivistic.

In model III, country/time variables are brought into the regression analysis. It is interesting to note that R-Square can be improved significantly in all ideologies when adding these new variables. (e.g. egalitarianism: model III can explain 27.8% of the variance, model I only 10.6%). In model III, one can see the effects of the countries on the justice ideologies. Generally, people from the Netherlands and West Germany are more egalitarian than Americans. This is not surprising, as the United States can be classified as liberal welfare state, where there are almost no state interventions in market affairs. The opposite effect can be seen in relation to individualism. People from the Netherlands are less individualistic than people from the United States. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), the Netherlands can be

characterised as a socialist welfare state, which stresses the redistributive task of the state. Therefore, the justice ideas in this country are less individualistic. West Germany, as a conservative welfare state, does not fall in between the USA and the Netherlands in both egalitarianism and individualism, as was expected. Ascriptivism is not the dominant justice ideology. Instead, individualism and egalitarianism are favoured very strongly in comparison to both other countries. This result might be a sign that in West Germany, questions of justice and the form of distributing welfare plays a far greater role than in the Netherlands or in the United States. Perhaps in Germany there is a higher politisation of matters pertaining to distribution and its evaluation.

One can see several trends in considering the time component. In Germany and the Netherlands, egalitarianism and individualism lost acceptance in 1996 in comparison with 1991. Unfortunately, there are no 1996 data available for the United States. One of the most interesting effects is that fatalism in West Germany increased in 1996 in comparison with 1991. This might lead to the conclusion that the welfare state in Germany is no longer in a position to fulfill its duty. The economic crisis, the high unemployment rate, and the waning perception of a radical political change might be the reason of this growing fatalism. People become more fatalistic when their basic needs are not met through appropriate structures. They feel as though they have been abandoned with their problems. The dangerous consequence of this is the recent development of right wing parties, who came out of recent local elections in some federal countries in Germany.

Apart from the above mentioned detailed results, some more general conclusions can be drawn.

1. Individualism and egalitarianism are not the only justice ideologies, although this might be more obvious considering welfare states. When analyzing people's attitudes toward the welfare state, one should try to look at all other possible ideological reactions to welfare policies. The rising fatalism in Germany from 1991 to 1996 is an example for this suggestion. The Douglasian Typology of social settings can provide an adequate framework to understand justice ideologies.

2. The theoretical assumption that every type of welfare state has its own major justice ideology can be only partially confirmed by the results, but not generally as the example of West Germany shows.<sup>6</sup>

3. It is not true that egalitarianism and individualism are two players in a zero-sum-game. It is not safe to assume the more the one, the less the other, and vice versa. Both can lose or gain prevalence at the same time. The reason for this might be a difference between countries in

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<sup>6</sup> Further examination and a different possibility of operationalization of these justice ideologies might, according to Douglas (especially the ideology of ascriptivism), foster clearer insights into these problems in future research.

the general preference of moral ideas, for example justice ideologies. The decreasing egalitarianism and individualism in West Germany is an example of this.

4. Some people argue that we are living in individualistic societies, that we find ourselves in purely egoistic society where everyone seeks his/her self-interest. One finding of this paper is that while egalitarianism is losing prominence, individualism is as well, at least in West Germany and the Netherlands. This shows that if the more socially directed egalitarian principles become weaker, individualism doesn't necessarily get stronger, and vice versa. This gives rise to the assumption that the two principles might not exclude each other.<sup>7</sup>

## **B. Justice Evaluation of Incomes**

In the following I want to look at the perception of the social inequality in the different countries by looking at the justice evaluation of income of people in different professions (see table 6 in the appendix) There are regression analyses of the non-reflexive justice evaluation of the income of a chairman of a large corporation and of an unskilled manual worker. Again in model I, only the influence of the sociodemographic variables, and variables related to various dimensions of the social stratification system, can be read. In model II attitudinal variables are added, in model III includes the justice ideologies individualism and egalitarianism, and model IV adds the country/time-dummies.

In the models I, the subjective perception of individual social standing has the clearest effect. People with a higher social standing tend to judge the chairman as less overrewarded and the unskilled worker as more underrewarded. It is interesting that neither one's own relational income nor the occupational status of being self-employed has a significant effect on the justice evaluations. One could imagine that all variables describing the social position of an individual might have an effect, as self interests and rational thoughts explain justice evaluations. If one judges the income of a high standing person as just, one's own high social standing and rewardance is legitimated. The argument also counts for people with higher education, who perceive the chairman as less overrewarded. Unemployed and others not in the labor force perceive the chairman as much more overrewarded. They have to bear the burden of high social inequality, as they sit at the bottom of the hierarchy, or fall completely out of the working system and have to rely on the state benefits to survive. The assumption that politically left standing people judge the chairman as being more overrewarded and the unskilled worker as too much underrewarded is confirmed by the results (Kelley & Evans 1993). Those oriented toward the political left favour egalitarianism and therefore a lower social inequality for political reasons.

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<sup>7</sup> On a theoretical level, and thinking about the communitarianism/liberalism debate, this could mean that liberal elements, which run parallel with individualism, and the free development of the individual realizing and seeking his/her own interests, must not necessarily be contradictory to communitarianist views of a solidaristic and egalitarian society.

In model II attitudinal variables are brought in. Again the results are not surprising. The higher people perceive the inequality in their country, the more overrewarded they find the chairman, and the more underrewarded they see the unskilled worker. The more satisfied people are with the political system, the less overrewarded they perceive the chairman, and the less underrewarded they see the unskilled worker.

In model III the justice ideologies individualism and egalitarianism are brought into the regression model. By doing this, the fit can be improved significantly in both cases, and both ideologies have a significant effect. Individualists tend to judge the chairman as being less overrewarded whereas egalitarians judge him as more overrewarded. For the judgement of the income of an unskilled worker the opposite result is found. Egalitarians judge the worker as more underrewarded, individualists as less underrewarded.

In model IV, the country-effects are shown. Again, the fit can be improved significantly by adding the new country/time-variables. While America and the Netherlands do not show a difference in that respect, in West Germany the chairman is seen as more overrewarded. The effect is even stronger for West Germany in 1996. The unskilled manual worker is judged as most underrewarded in the United States and less underrewarded in West Germany and the Netherlands. In 1996, the trend in these countries shifts in the direction of less underrewarded than in 1991, as well as in comparison to the United States 1991. In West Germany and in the United States there is high income inequality. Therefore there is a very strong tendency to judge the income of 'upper-class' occupations as too overrewarded and 'under-class' occupations as too underrewarded. Here again there are signs that the welfare state should be restructured in order to provide more redistribution, and overcome the existing high income inequality in these countries.

To sum up, the welfare state is an important factor of social integration, providing tools of redistribution to reduce high social inequality. Justice attitudes and their articulations are an important indicator of the degree of social consensus within societies and regarding the welfare state (Mau 1997). Theoretically, one would suggest that meritocratic and egalitarian principles are both important as justice guidelines for the institutionalisation of welfare benefits. Liberal and socialist welfare states place too much emphasis on only one of the ideologies. Looking empirically at the justice evaluations the opposite can be shown, namely that the consensus in West Germany on the justness of social inequality is shattered. People's social standing does influence justice evaluations in this country. The reason for this might be the economic crisis in West Germany (with a high unemployment rate and low economic growth) in contrast to the United States and the Netherlands, resulting also in a political crisis of the German welfare state. Much effort has to be made to strengthen the German economy, and to legitimize its welfare state institutions. Because welfare states need a moral basis to be renewed and adapted to new conditions, justice judgements must be taken seriously, and preferred ideas of justice and their change must have an adequate influence on political changes of the welfare system.

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## Appendix:

**Table 1: Dependent Variables: Justice Ideologies and Justice Evaluations of Income**

<i>Justice Ideologies</i> <sup>1</sup>	
Egalitarianism	The most important thing is that people get what they need even if this means allocating money from those who have earned more than they need.
	The government should guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living.
	The government should provide a job for everyone who wants one.
Individualism	There is an incentive for individual effort only if differences in income are large enough.
	It is all right if businessmen make good profits, because everyone benefits in the end.
	People would not want to take extra responsibility at work unless they were paid extra for it.
Fatalism	The way things are these days, it is hard to know what <i>is</i> just anymore.
	There is no point arguing about social justice since it is impossible to change things.
Ascriptivism	People are entitled to keep what they have earned, even if this means some people will be wealthier than others.
	People are entitled to pass on their wealth to their children.
<i>Job-income of different professions (Jasso-equation)</i>	
Justice Evaluation ( <i>income of chairman</i> )	What do you think a chairman or managing director of a large corporation earns per year on average?
	Now tell me what you think a just and fair average yearly income for a chairman or managing director of a large corporation would be?
Justice Evaluation ( <i>income of unskilled worker</i> )	What do you think an unskilled manual worker earns per year on average?
	Now tell me what you think a just and fair average yearly income for an unskilled manual worker would be?

<sup>1</sup> All items are coded as 5-point-scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree)

**Table 2: Independent Variables**


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Sex	Female = 1, Male = 0
Age	Respondents' age in years
Size of household	Number of people living in household
Subjective class	Own social standing (10-point-scale: 1 = low social standing, 10 = high social standing)
Relational income	Ratio of individual equivalent household income to country-mean equivalent household-income
Education	Casmin-categories (5-point-scale: 1 = low education, 5 = highly educated); see König (1988)
Self-employed	Full- and part-time, casual work, reduced working hours (Dummy)
Retired/disabled	(Dummy)
Unemployed	(Dummy)
Not in labour	Housewives and housemen, students at school/college, temporary leave (Dummy)
Political left	Political views (10-point-scale: 1 = right, 10 = left)
Judgement of income differences in country	What do you think about the difference in incomes people have in COUNTRY? Are the differences much too large, somewhat too large, about right, somewhat too small, or much too small? (5-point-scale)
Satisfaction with the political system	How satisfied are you with the political system in COUNTRY? (7-point-scale: 1 = completely dissatisfied, 7 = completely satisfied)

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**Table 3: Factor Structure of Justice Ideologies**

	<b>Egalitarianism</b>	<b>Individualism</b>	<b>Ascriptivism</b>	<b>Fatalism</b>	<b>h<sup>2</sup></b>
Fair if people get what they need	.451	-.010	-.115	.006	.217
Government: minimum standards of living	.643	-.027	-.011	.020	.414
Government: job for everyone	.587	.012	-.058	.169	.377
Income differences: incentives	-.018	.596	.035	.063	.361
Income differences: benefits all	-.169	.412	.133	-.020	.216
Income differences: responsibility	.170	.422	.082	.103	.225
Fair to keep what people have earned	-.075	.315	.471	-.051	.329
Fair to pass on wealth	-.120	.056	.734	.018	.557
Hard to know what is just	.079	-.051	.062	.621	.398
Things can not be changed	.055	.189	-.086	.494	.290
Proportion of explained variance in percent	10.482	8.450	8.142	6.762	

Maximum Likelihood  
Chi<sup>2</sup> = 42.132, p < 0.001

**Table 4: Regression Analyses of Justice Ideologies**

	Egalitarianism			Individualism			Ascriptivism			Fatalism <sup>1</sup>		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
Women	.057 ** (2.697)	.022 (1.052)	.081 *** (4.234)	-.161 *** (-8.074)	-.144 *** (-7.261)	-.128 *** (-6.635)	.066 ** (3.150)	.077 *** (3.633)	.032 (1.599)	.078 *** (3.639)	.064 ** (2.995)	.063 ** (2.945)
Age	-.003 ** (-3.136)	-.003 *** (-3.379)	-.003 *** (-3.447)	.001 (1.124)	.001 (1.153)	.000 (.333)	.002 * (2.329)	.002 * (2.025)	.002 * (2.246)	-.001 (-1.110)	-.000 (-.159)	.000 (.012)
Size of household	-.022 ** (-2.591)	-.024 ** (-2.932)	-.025 *** (-3.254)	-.003 (-.315)	-.002 (-.219)	.010 (1.304)	.042 *** (4.958)	.041 *** (4.852)	.030 *** (3.729)	-.004 (-.478)	.000 (.030)	.001 (.080)
Subjective Class	.003 (.429)	.016 * (2.340)	.009 (1.403)	.022 *** (3.290)	.016 * (2.367)	.014 * (2.125)	.032 *** (4.579)	.028 *** (4.006)	.027 *** (3.977)	-.014 * (-1.969)	-.009 (-1.276)	-.012 (-1.639)
Rel. Income	-.079 *** (-3.843)	-.076 *** (-3.795)	-.166 *** (-8.696)	.094 *** (4.843)	.092 *** (4.778)	.074 *** (3.883)	-.032 (-1.561)	-.035 (-1.707)	.036 (1.823)	-.088 *** (-4.271)	-.080 *** (-3.912)	-.086 *** (-4.125)
No income mentioned	.068 * (2.167)	.078 ** (2.568)	-.031 (-1.070)	.122 *** (4.134)	.118 *** (4.026)	.007 (.244)	-.060 (-1.945)	-.058 (-1.874)	.042 (1.396)	-.018 (-.587)	-.027 (-.885)	-.050 (-1.590)
Education	-.067 *** (-8.850)	-.055 *** (-7.501)	-.008 (-1.106)	-.085 *** (-11.872)	-.091 *** (-12.707)	-.063 *** (-8.879)	.018 * (2.419)	.014 (1.798)	-.026 *** (-3.534)	-.141 *** (-18.317)	-.134 *** (-17.483)	-.131 *** (-16.469)
Self-employed	-.218 *** (-5.864)	-.213 *** (-5.925)	-.188 *** (-5.611)	.116 *** (3.321)	.114 *** (3.289)	.118 *** (3.515)	.045 (1.221)	.047 (1.275)	-.008 (-.224)	-.051 (-1.391)	-.059 (-1.624)	-.064 (-1.748)
Retired/Disabled	.102 ** (2.728)	.093 ** (2.589)	.045 (1.326)	.048 (1.376)	.052 (1.508)	.043 (1.290)	-.067 (-1.796)	-.063 (-1.693)	-.025 (-.725)	.133 *** (3.523)	.126 *** (3.372)	.121 *** (3.256)
Unemployed	.143 * (2.441)	.105 (1.855)	.106 * (2.017)	-.005 (-.087)	.013 (.241)	.030 (.560)	-.038 (-1.196)	-.027 (-.693)	-.024 (-.725)	.102 (1.720)	.085 (1.440)	.060 (1.015)
Others not in work	.086 ** (3.069)	.093 *** (3.448)	-.037 (-1.428)	.036 (1.384)	.033 (1.257)	-.009 (-.349)	-.077 ** (-2.756)	-.080 ** (-2.874)	-.011 (-.394)	-.086 ** (-3.065)	-.080 ** (-2.905)	-.080 ** (-2.846)
Political left	.109 *** (18.978)	.085 *** (14.887)	.078 *** (14.594)	-.085 *** (-15.642)	-.073 *** (-13.299)	-.075 *** (-14.127)	-.073 *** (-12.770)	-.066 *** (-11.339)	-.055 *** (-9.892)	-.009 (-1.530)	-.020 *** (-3.332)	-.023 *** (-3.905)
No pol. orientation mentioned	.016 (.194)	-.023 (-.277)	-.059 (-1.774)	-.106 (-1.330)	-.088 (-1.106)	-.111 (-1.443)	-.131 (-1.545)	-.119 (-1.407)	-.021 (-.268)	.244 ** (2.726)	.233 ** (2.628)	.266 ** (3.007)
Income differences in Country		.204 *** (18.609)	.169 *** (16.192)		-.093 *** (-8.764)	-.120 *** (-11.552)		-.032 ** (-2.826)	-.044 *** (-4.011)		.012 (1.035)	.013 (1.125)
Satisfaction with political system		-.034 *** (-5.346)	-.027 *** (-4.640)		.019 ** (3.032)	.022 *** (3.790)		.029 *** (4.487)	.015 * (2.471)		-.069 *** (-10.483)	-.068 *** (-10.393)
West Germany 1991			.740 *** (27.109)			.282 *** (10.340)			-.612 *** (-21.553)			-.060 * (-2.074)
West Germany 1996			.541 *** (16.661)			.278 *** (8.570)			-.608 *** (-18.001)			.144 *** (4.213)
The Netherlands 1991			.353 *** (13.122)			-.063 * (-2.330)			-.183 *** (-6.546)			.037 (1.326)
The Netherlands 1996			.063 (1.881)			-.321 *** (-9.553)			-.625 *** (-17.869)			-
Intercept	-.240 ** (-3.125)	-.998 *** (-11.883)	-1.358 *** (-16.741)	.739 *** (10.212)	1.086 *** (13.377)	1.046 *** (12.897)	-.046 (-.596)	.088 (1.017)	.647 *** (7.669)	.720 *** (9.088)	.645 *** (7.238)	.639 *** (7.035)
R <sup>2</sup>	.106	.167	.278	.098	.113	.178	.051	.056	.163	.112	.132	.139
N=5687											5069	

Regression coefficients and T-values in parantheses; Countries: United States, West Germany, The Netherlands; Reference-group in models III: United States in 1991

<sup>1</sup> Estimation without cases of the Netherlands 1996, where the variables for fatalism are missing.

Table 5: Regression Analyses of Justice Ideologies (Country-Specific Analyses)

	Egalitarianism			Individualism		
	US	WG	NL	US	WG	NL
Women	.177 *** (3.679)	.069 * (2.404)	.029 (1.013)	-.167 *** (-4.010)	-.098 *** (-3.198)	-.107 *** (-3.495)
Age	-.008 *** (-4.534)	-.001 (-.867)	.000 (-.332)	-.004 * (-2.288)	.001 (.747)	.005 *** (3.441)
Size of household	-.056 ** (-3.070)	-.004 (-.313)	-.023 (-1.888)	.006 (.377)	.017 (1.331)	-.013 (-.977)
Subjective Class	-.005 (-.354)	-.003 (-.320)	.025 ** (2.605)	.015 (1.188)	.035 *** (3.237)	-.008 (-.805)
Rel. Income	-.171 *** (-4.696)	-.137 *** (-4.065)	-.112 *** (-3.389)	.118 *** (3.719)	.019 (.537)	.012 (.347)
No income mentioned	-.009 (-.104)	-.072 * (-2.092)	.047 (.810)	-.001 (-.016)	-.034 (-.911)	.082 (1.340)
Education	-.059 ** (-2.995)	.001 (.122)	.012 (1.166)	-.082 *** (-4.833)	-.044 *** (-3.874)	-.077 *** (-7.093)
Self-employed	-.187 * (-2.488)	-.200 *** (-3.539)	-.135 ** (-2.817)	.129 * (1.980)	.133 * (2.207)	.068 (1.340)
Retired/Disabled	-.015 (-.180)	-.004 (-.094)	.133 * (2.485)	.062 (.840)	.052 (1.018)	-.021 (-.368)
Unemployed	.210 (1.647)	-.048 (-.583)	.195 * (2.558)	.227 * (2.057)	.012 (.130)	-.062 (-.773)
Others not in work	.051 (.613)	-.020 (-.550)	-.008 (-.227)	.029 (.410)	-.043 (-1.088)	-.006 (-.146)
Political left	.070 *** (5.642)	.053 *** (6.301)	.094 *** (11.671)	-.032 ** (-3.003)	-.068 *** (-7.540)	-.104 *** (-12.236)
No pol. orientation mentioned	.099 (.510)	-.138 (-1.499)	.049 (.300)	-.011 (-.066)	-.189 (-1.916)	.059 (.340)
Income differences in Country	.142 *** (5.869)	.154 *** (8.928)	.220 *** (14.112)	-.050 * (-2.390)	-.094 *** (-5.137)	-.190 *** (-11.580)
Satisfaction with political system	-.050 *** (-3.262)	-.061 *** (-6.870)	.015 (1.680)	.020 (1.495)	.049 *** (5.199)	.009 (.929)
Year:1996	-	-.178 *** (-6.247)	-.250 *** (-7.812)	-	.008 (.265)	-.327 *** (-9.703)
Intercept	-.609 ** (-3.122)	-.487 *** (-3.896)	-1.604 *** (-13.583)	.828 *** (4.890)	.925 *** (6.925)	1.517 *** (12.186)
R <sup>2</sup>	.167	.154	.254	.066	.115	.217
N	1270	2268	2149	1270	2268	2149

Regression coefficients and T-values in parantheses; Countries: United States (US), West Germany (WG), The Netherlands (NL)

**Continuing Table 5: Regression Analyses of Justice Ideologies (Country-Specific Analyses)**

	Ascriptivism			Fatalism		
	US	WG	NL	US	WG	NL <sup>1</sup>
Women	.038 (1.298)	.005 (.129)	.066 * (2.201)	.081 (1.787)	.057 (1.720)	.053 (1.550)
Age	.000 (.226)	.005 *** (3.265)	-.001 (-.480)	-.001 (-.668)	.001 (.683)	.000 (-.043)
Size of household	-.002 (-.184)	.074 *** (4.568)	-.004 (-.304)	.002 (.088)	.003 (.234)	.004 (.282)
Subjective Class	-.009 (-.997)	.065 *** (4.830)	.020 * (1.945)	.006 (.447)	-.033 ** (-2.826)	.003 (.290)
Rel. Income	.048 * (2.138)	.030 (.664)	-.028 (-.819)	-.080 * (-2.305)	-.084 * (-2.129)	-.052 (-1.315)
No income mentioned	-.009 (-.180)	.036 (.792)	.034 (.569)	.014 (.179)	-.061 (-1.517)	-.077 (-1.165)
Education	-.027 * (-2.277)	-.026 (-1.804)	-.033 ** (-3.052)	-.163 *** (-8.749)	-.128 *** (-10.349)	-.102 *** (-8.495)
Self-employed	.045 (.974)	-.026 (-3.343)	-.044 (-881)	-.045 (-.637)	-.079 (-1.204)	-.052 (-.988)
Retired/Disabled	-.174 *** (-3.338)	-.011 (-.179)	.021 (.377)	.148 (1.834)	.090 (1.614)	.106 (1.632)
Unemployed	.005 (.059)	.004 (.040)	-.043 (-5.43)	.149 (1.233)	-.008 (-.078)	.052 (.571)
Others not in work	.038 (.757)	-.039 (-790)	.000 (.007)	-.048 (-618)	-.115 ** (-2.693)	-.033 (-.802)
Political left	-.024 ** (-3.130)	-.060 *** (-5.284)	-.064 *** (-7.728)	.004 (.317)	-.027 ** (-2.689)	-.050 *** (-5.279)
No pol. orientation mentioned	-.077 (-644)	-.068 (-555)	.242 (1.411)	.074 (.400)	.329 ** (3.048)	-
Income differences in Country	-.021 (-1.379)	-.027 (-1.197)	-.068 *** (-4.212)	.010 (.430)	.021 (1.052)	.034 (1.812)
Satisfaction with political system	.022 * (2.308)	.027 * (2.323)	.002 (.255)	-.070 *** (-4.851)	-.072 *** (-7.017)	-.057 *** (-5.656)
Year:1996	-	.015 (.397)	-.483 *** (-14.552)	-	.211 *** (6.338)	-
Intercept	.775 *** (6.470)	-.465 ** (-2.789)	.871 *** (7.114)	.580 ** (3.140)	.656 *** (4.490)	.507 *** (3.545)
R <sup>2</sup>	.039	.069	.144	.137	.153	.123
N	1270	2268	2149	1270	2268	2149

Regression coefficients and T-values in parantheses; Countries: United States (US), West Germany (WG), The Netherlands (NL)

<sup>1</sup> Calculated only with 1991-Data, as the variables for fatalism are missing for 1996.

Table 6: Regression Analyses of the Justice Evaluation of Income in Different Professions

	Chairman of a large corporation				Unskilled manual worker			
	I	II	III	IV	I	II	III	IV
Women	-.067 (-3.110) **	-.098 (-4.678) ***	-.107 (-5.076) ***	-.097 (-4.662) ***	-.021 (-2.792) **	-.012 (-1.533)	-.009 (-1.210)	-.004 (-.586)
Age	.002 (1.862)	.001 (1.523)	.002 (1.809)	.001 (1.102)	.000 (-.179)	.000 (.235)	.000 (-.094)	.000 (.134)
Size of household	-.010 (-1.129)	-.010 (-1.239)	-.009 (-1.051)	.001 (.167)	-.007 (-2.329) *	-.007 (-2.251) *	-.008 (-2.506) *	-.007 (-2.355) *
Subjective Class	-.029 (-4.020) ***	-.019 (-2.703) **	-.019 (-2.730) **	-.019 (-2.759) **	.010 (3.945) ***	.007 (2.723) **	.007 (2.835) **	.005 (2.136) *
Rel. Income	.029 (1.404)	.034 (1.681)	.043 (2.104) *	.023 (1.120)	.011 (1.462)	.009 (1.278)	.006 (.858)	-.004 (-.585)
No income mentioned	.182 (5.358) ***	.181 (5.460) ***	.179 (5.432) ***	.094 (2.814) **	-.003 (-.211)	-.003 (-.292)	-.002 (-.176)	-.016 (-1.382)
Education	-.040 (-5.225) ***	-.031 (-4.047) ***	-.031 (-4.063) ***	-.015 (-1.909)	-.005 (-1.797)	-.008 (-2.896) **	-.009 (-3.139) **	-.004 (-1.536)
Self-employed	-.046 (-1.236)	-.041 (-1.119)	-.024 (-.672)	-.015 (-.422)	.003 (.253)	.001 (.064)	-.006 (-.452)	-.003 (-.261)
Retired/Disabled	.021 (.539)	.014 (.366)	.009 (.246)	.007 (.178)	-.029 (-2.089) *	-.028 (-2.039) *	-.025 (-1.833)	-.029 (-2.211) *
Unemployed	.157 (2.655) **	.119 (2.067) *	.111 (1.934) *	.121 (2.131) *	-.022 (-1.052)	-.011 (-.509)	-.007 (-.345)	-.020 (-.965)
Others not in work	.059 (2.095) *	.065 (2.358) *	.061 (2.187) *	.039 (1.395)	-.032 (-3.147) **	-.034 (-3.404) ***	-.031 (-3.147) **	-.038 (-3.784) ***
Political left	.051 (8.785) ***	.030 (5.168) ***	.021 (3.496) ***	.018 (3.091) **	-.017 (-7.998) ***	-.010 (-4.728) ***	-.007 (-3.032) **	-.009 (-4.046) ***
No pol. orientation mentioned	-.147 (-1.472)	-.186 (-1.913)	-.184 (-1.900)	-.207 (-2.161) *	-.046 (-1.315)	-.034 (-.980)	-.036 (-1.043)	-.029 (-.844)
Income differences in Country		.172 (15.133) ***	.155 (13.181) ***	.153 (13.033) ***		-.058 (-14.243) ***	-.051 (-12.135) ***	-.048 (-11.379) ***
Satisfaction with political system		-.025 (-3.767) ***	-.022 (-3.390) ***	-.016 (-2.538) *		.006 (2.617) **	.005 (2.139) *	.006 (2.711) **
Egalitarianism			.063 (4.594) ***	.016 (1.117)			-.029 (-5.916) ***	-.032 (-6.219) ***
Individualism			-.051 (-3.666) ***	-.078 (-5.576) ***			.012 (2.502) *	.014 (2.842) **
West Germany 1991				.215 (6.801) ***				.027 (2.341) *
West Germany 1996				.336 (9.011) ***				.128 (9.560) ***
The Netherlands 1991				-.034 (-1.170)				.051 (4.907) ***
The Netherlands 1996				-.024 (-.637)				.089 (6.620) ***
Perception								
Intercept	.488 (6.244) ***	-.135 (-1.568)	-.022 (-.252)	-.155 (-1.713)	-.118 (-4.227) ***	.092 (2.961) **	.051 (1.622)	-.009 (-.271)
R <sup>2</sup>	.040	.087	.093	.120	.027	.067	.074	.096
N	5127				5235			

Regression coefficients and T-values in parantheses; Countries: United States, West Germany, The Netherlands; Reference-group in models IV: United States in 1991

**Table 7: Regression Analyses of the Justice Evaluation of Income in Different Professions (Country-specific Analyses)**

	Chairman of a large national company			Unskilled manual worker		
	US	WG	NL	US	WG	NL
Women	-.082 *	-.130 **	-.044	.008	-.002	-.011
	(-2.461)	(-2.815)	(-1.927)	(.364)	(-.183)	(-1.332)
Age	.000	.001	.001	.000	.000	.000
	(-.071)	(.442)	(1.001)	(-.213)	(.283)	(-1.058)
Size of household	-.019	.018	-.007	-.011	.005	-.015 ***
	(-1.500)	(.928)	(-.767)	(-1.366)	(.983)	(-4.189)
Subjective Class	-.003	-.036 *	-.009	.008	.006	.003
	(-.254)	(-2.192)	(-1.127)	(1.149)	(1.588)	(1.145)
Rel. Income	.022	.106 *	-.044	.011	.001	-.028 **
	(.852)	(1.983)	(-1.707)	(.678)	(.108)	(-2.864)
No income mentioned	.024	.147 *	.034	.037	-.037 **	-.017
	(.382)	(2.541)	(.740)	(.939)	(-2.657)	(-.955)
Education	-.004	-.034 *	.003	-.009	-.006	-.002
	(-.315)	(-2.018)	(.425)	(-1.001)	(-1.441)	(-.542)
Self-employed	.038	-.021	-.042	.023	-.002	-.014
	(.751)	(-.226)	(-1.137)	(.705)	(-.070)	(-.993)
Retired/Disabled	.091	.016	-.040	.004	-.033	-.032 *
	(1.518)	(.207)	(-.942)	(.095)	(-1.731)	(-2.022)
Unemployed	.091	.267 *	-.023	-.017	-.003	-.034
	(1.049)	(1.966)	(-.379)	(-.304)	(-.081)	(-1.501)
Others not in work	.020	.047	.029	-.057	-.049 ***	-.033 **
	(.346)	(.806)	(1.002)	(-1.566)	(-3.380)	(-2.969)
Political left	.004	.013	.030 ***	-.009	-.009 **	-.008 ***
	(.402)	(.952)	(4.431)	(-1.661)	(-2.572)	(-3.239)
No pol. orientation mentioned	.029	-.409 *	.005	-.158	.000	-.015
	(.199)	(-2.327)	(.030)	(-1.786)	(.012)	(-.285)
Income differences in Country	.117 ***	.208 ***	.137 ***	-.056 ***	-.046 ***	-.045 ***
	(6.776)	(7.271)	(10.472)	(-5.200)	(-6.578)	(-8.961)
Satisfaction with political system	-.027 *	-.026	.001	.009	.006	.003
	(-2.470)	(-1.832)	(.159)	(1.291)	(1.662)	(1.196)
Egalitarianism	.045 *	.024	-.010	-.047 ***	-.032 ***	-.015 *
	(2.315)	(.691)	(-.619)	(-3.821)	(-3.732)	(-2.290)
Individualism	-.049 *	-.123 ***	-.051 ***	-.009	.024 **	.026 ***
	(-2.279)	(-3.988)	(-3.209)	(-.676)	(3.178)	(4.319)
Year:1996	-	.104 *	.000	-	.105 ***	.043 ***
		(2.226)	(-.008)		(9.154)	(4.305)
Intercept	.014	.031	-.335 ***	.035	-.017	.073 *
	(.105)	(.151)	(-3.391)	(.409)	(-.341)	(1.942)
R <sup>2</sup>	.077	.077	.121	.066	.114	.154
N	1172	1962	2054	1210	2185	2034

Regression coefficients and T-values in parantheses; Countries: United States (US), West Germany (WG), The Netherlands (NL)